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Abstract.  Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then 
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generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the 
foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent 
to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing 
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fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Philosophical phenomenology (Husserl’s doctrine, first of 
all) establishes an inherent link between: (a) logic and 
mathematics; (b) philosophy; (c) psychology: The link relates 
the three by means a kind of transcendental idealism in the 
German philosophical tradition. Thus a bridge for transfer and 
reinterpretation between notions of psychology, logic and 
mathematics is created under the necessary condition for those 
concepts to be considered as philosophical as referred to that 
kind of transcendental subject.  
Mach’s and Husserl’s doctrines share descriptivism, but 
they are radically different to phenomenality distinguishing the 
phenomenalism of the former from the phenomenology of the 
latter. 
Mach presupposed some constant metaphysical elements, to 
which both consciousness and reality can be reduced being at 
the same time rather something middle. 
What Husserl universalized was the process of reduction 
itself allowing of the “phenomenon” of anything to be deduced 
after “bracketing reality” without presupposing whatever 
universal phenomena.  
If one applies Mach’s economy of thought to 
his “elements” therefore reducing them to the necessary 
properties and “razoring” any metaphysical hypotheses about 
their metaphysical nature including the sensual one, they might 
be identified as the successive stages of Husserl’s reduction.   
The unification of Mach’s phenomenalism and Husserl’s 
phenomenology leads to a kind of Pythagoreanism reducing all 
being to the natural numbers just as in Leopold Kroneker 
famous sentence. Then the universal mathematizability of 
being and therefore that of all scientific theories seems to be 
reliably grounded.  
One can question about the mathemazability of one (or any) 
scientific theory formally of that historical and conceptual 
background. The intention is the approach of Husserl’s 
phenomenology to be formalized and applied in both 
directions: to intension (“eidos”, “phenomenon”, intention) and 
to reality.  
One can introduce “epoché” both to “phenomenological” 
and to “eidetic reduction”. As to the latter, it would mean the 
entire processes of removing one by one all free variables of 
the corresponding extension.  
     
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a few 
features of Mach’s doctrine relevant and sufficient for the 
reductionist reading of Husserl’s phenomenology. Section 3 
offers a way to be unified Mach’s phenomenalism and 
Husserl’s phenomenology my means of Mach’s economy of 
thought applied to his phenomenalism. Section 4 compares 
reductionism in mathematics in the other sciences. The last,  
5th Section summarizes and generalizes the paper to a few 
conclusions and directions for future work.  
      
2. MACH’S “RAZOR” AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
REDUCTIONISM    
Still the original “razor”, Occam’s was created to remove 
redundant hypotheses and unfounded assumptions [1], [2]. 
They are the source of delusions and confusions [3].  
Science still since the age of Euclid and Greek philosophy 
has aspired after the reduction of all knowledge and being to a 
few first principles or elements, from which all the rest might 
be deduced logically and convincingly. In other words, science 
has always utilized that “razor” as a methodological principle. 
However, science of the modern age invented another 
“razor”, that of experience and experiments [4]. Both “razors” 
are the ground of science in nowadays, however they often 
offer different results inconsistent to each other [5] 
Occam’s razor removes redundant hypotheses and restricts 
the appearance of new facts inconsistent to the established 
principles. On the contrary, the experimental razor removes 
established principles by new facts. So, science turns to be 
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doubly razored, both to outdated principles and redundant 
assumptions.      
However, the two razors are directed oppositely to each 
other, and the intersection of their joint action might generate 
only an empty set for the ideal, doubly razored science. 
If one identifies Russell’s barber’s razor1 with both razors 
treating science, the emptiness of the set above might be 
proved: the one razor corresponds to that intended to those who 
do not razor themselves (as the established principles razored 
externally by the facts), and the other razor, to those who razor 
themselves (as the established principles razoring themselves 
from redundant hypotheses). Thus the established principles 
turn out to be in Russell’s barber’s position. 
Mach’s doctrine including both descriptivism and 
phenomenalism [8, 9, 10], [11], [12], [13] can be considered as 
one of the most elegant way out of the contradiction. As 
Russell’s barber’s existence, the existence of a nonempty 
intersection of the action of both razors is able to be postulated 
without any contradiction. Its elements can be called “sensual” 
or however else, and then, two different, even disjunctive 
contexts of use (or interpretation) are able to be introduced: as 
first principles of description, from which any derivative 
description in science can be deduced consistently; and as first 
elements of the phenomena experienced immediately or by 
experiments [11].  
Mach’s approach has the double advantage to be both 
simplest and self-applicable. His “razor” removes the 
hypothesis of “atoms” or material reality as equally redundant 
therefore angering both “Church of Physics” [14], [15] and 
Lenin [16].  
Thus, Mach’s doctrine can be seen as a kind of radical, 
fundamental and philosophical reductionism or “ontological 
reductionism” according to Oxford companion to philosophy 
[17]. Of course, the real reductionism in science does not refer 
to the elements of the being itself as a rule, in the exceptions of 
which Mach is almost alone for he applied his approach to 
physics influencing Einstein’s thought to general relativity 
though rejecting his relation to it later [18], [19]. 
In fact, reductionism in science and philosophy share that of 
removing the redundant, therefore being quite relative as a 
common structure though interpreted in different contexts and 
degree of generalization.  
The realization of Mach’s doctrine as reductionism assists 
to be further discussed Husserl’s phenomenology in the same 
way [20], [21] for Husserl himself introduced three kinds of 
(just right) reduction [22, 23] as the methods for one to achieve 
to phenomenology from reality. 
Husserl distinguished himself from Mach’s phenomenalism 
flatly [24], [25], [26, 27], [28, 29]. What is the essential 
difference between Mach’s and Husserl’s “phenomenon”? One 
can notice immediately that Mach’s phenomenalism is a form 
of naturalism according to Husserl’s criticism [30].  All 
phenomena after Mach are complexes of one and the same 
elements and thus only different re-orderings of them [31], 
[32]. Indeed, Mach’s elements are not Boltzmann’s atoms; 
however, both kinds generate phenomena similarly, by their 
reordering as still Democritus suggested [33].  
                                                 
1 The kidding version [6] of Russell’s paradox [7] about the set of all 
sets is meant. 
The phenomenon after Husserl is maybe rather the shared 
eidos of real things therefore unified them as a class. That eidos 
cannot be and is not defined in relation to some universal 
elements whatever they would be. It can be defined only to 
relation of that class real things, from which can be obtained by 
reduction and only then postulated as generating them. Thus, 
Mach’s descriptivism can be conserved [34]. 
The dimensions of reduction of reality are quite different 
after Husserl in comparison with those after Mach. They are 
mathematical for the former [35], but physical for the latter 
[36]. One can notice the comparison of Ernst Mach’s 
reductionism and Erwin Schrödinger’s methodology [37] as a 
way for Husserl’s phenomenology and Mach’s phenomenalism 
to be reconciled to each other. If one finds a way to unify 
physics and mathematics into a single science erasing or 
fulfilling the gap between them, this will be at the same time a 
way to unify Husserl’s phenomenology with Mach’s 
phenomenalism. This would be a solution of the problem 
“phenomenalism vs. phenomenology” [38].  
3. MACH’S “RAZOR” TO ITSELF: 
HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY    
One can attempt to overcome the obvious mismatch between 
Husserl’s phenomenology and Mach’s phenomenalism right 
utilizing the razor of Mach’s economy of thought ... however to 
itself. 
In fact, Mach’s elements, whatever they are called and 
would be, are only a new hypothesis. The principle of economy 
of thought [39] would remove them if the same result might be 
achieved without their utilization. Even more, Husserl’s 
phenomenology might be recognized as Mach’s 
phenomenalism razored from the redundant elements. 
Indeed, those elements are situated on the boundary between 
consciousness and reality therefore to bridge them over the gap 
deducing consciousness in the one direction, and reality in the 
opposite direction. One can define them more economically as 
something middle, the only necessary property of which is to 
suspend the law of excluded middle as to the pair of reality and 
consciousness.  
Consequently, the principle of economy of thought applied 
to Mach’s elements themselves reduces them to suspending 
“excluded middle” as to reality and consciousness. The nature 
of that middle exhausts itself by being right “middle” as what 
the reduction after Husserl allows of being thought.  
Indeed, the middle between reality and phenomenon in 
Husserl is reduction. Returning back to Mach, his “elements” 
might be already interpreted as successive stages of the process 
of reduction. Their names are only ordinal natural numbers 
after they should be common for any process of reduction to 
any phenomenon. That commonness is required by Mach’s way 
to be defined the elements. 
Summarizing, if Mach’s elements are deliberated from any 
metaphysical nature just according to his doctrine, they turn out 
to be natural numbers generating consciousness in the one 
direction, and reality in the opposite direction. Then 
furthermore, they are absolutely consistent to Husserl’s 
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phenomenology as the successive stage of reduction leading 
from reality to phenomena.  
There is still one, even more economical scheme for the 
same, realized by Brouwer’s intuitionism [40]: after both 
consciousness and reality are derivative from natural numbers, 
they themselves might be interpreted as two kinds of numbers: 
finite natural numbers and transfinite ordinal numbers, and the 
middle consists only in admitting the middle between the two 
kinds of numbers. If all those are granted, any “creative 
subject” might construct the universe [41].          
4. MATHEMATICAL REDUCTIONISM 
VERSUS SCIENTIFIC REDUCTIONISM    
At first glance, the opposition of mathematical reductionism 
[42] to scientific reductionism [43] is wrong for mathematics is 
one among the other sciences. Nevertheless, its type of 
reductionism is essentially different from that in all the rest:  
Its fundamental methods, the axiomatic and deductive ones 
are reductionist [44]. Its universal validity in the contemporary 
mathematics implies that any entity claiming to be 
mathematical has to be equivalently reducible to a certain 
structure, which can be exhaustedly described by a few axioms. 
All mathematics is strictly subordinated by complete 
reducibility leading to arithmetic (the natural numbers) and set 
theory. 
The reducibility in all other sciences, even in physics, which 
shares rather features of mathematics, is only partial and 
unstrict. There are even sciences such as esthetics founded on 
subjective estimation and interpretation or such as history 
avoiding any generalization and describing events as unique. 
Nevertheless, one or other form of reductionism might exist in 
each of them. How many the sciences and even the theories and 
methods are, so many the kinds of reductionism are.  
The reductionism in mathematics in that background is total 
and maximal. Particularly, it does not admit any exceptions. 
That exception in any mathematical theory testifies 
incompleteness. The incompleteness as well as any 
contradiction means its inconsistency: that theory is false. 
Consequently, mathematics is the only science where the 
concepts of truth and reducibility are inherently linked to each 
other. All other science even partially irreducible can be 
nevertheless true for the correspondence to reality. 
Mathematics does not presuppose reality [45]: the condition 
of that is total reductionism. Consequently, its reductionism is 
founded in the kind of truth in it and in the renunciation of (the 
concept of) reality. 
Hilbert mathematics involves that kind of total reductionism 
into the being itself. The ultimate base is the natural numbers 
as still Kroneker proclaimed [46]. 
One can visualize that being in Hilbert mathematics utilizing 
Einstein’s way to exemplify the curvature of space-time in 
general relativity. He used the two-dimensional analogy of a 
curved surface, to which people have immediate sensual 
intuition about both externality and internality of it [47]. 
One can figure that the creatures in a computer game have 
consciousness and perceive its environment and their bodies 
approximately as we perceive them … or ours. Nevertheless, 
we, being right outside of the computer, which is their universe, 
know very well that their existence and environment are only 
software programs, bits of information of a Turing machine.  
Then we might imagine our universe as a quantum computer 
where the alleged boundary between software and hardware is 
already overcome by quantum information and its units, the 
qubits. Any qubit is both software and hardware corresponding 
to each other, but always disjunctive being complementary to 
each other.  
The base in the former and in the latter case is one and the 
same: information, though classical information and separated 
hardware, on the one hand, and quantum information merging 
with the hardware, on the other hand. 
The former case corresponds to Gödel mathematics, 
 the latter case to Hilbert mathematics, and the present analogy 
between those cases to the model of Hilbert mathematics into 
Gödel mathematics, intended to demonstrate the not less 
consistence of the former to that of the latter.  
Furthermore, in Hilbert mathematics, the transition between 
mathematics and physics should be gradual and smooth. The 
concept and quantity of information and its theory can be that 
“middle” situated between mathematics and physics 
transforming the former into the latter gradually. 
In essence, information can be considered not less as those 
elements ultimate as Mach’s [48], which generate in one 
context, that of consciousness, mathematics and all phenomena 
in Husserl’s sense, but into the opposite context, that of reality, 
initially the physical and further all the rest in the universe, i.e. 
reality.    
Information can be thought as the more fundamental 
generalization of the natural numbers where the natural 
numbers are right considered as those ultimate elements 
generating both conscious and reality as two equally probable 
disjunctive alternatives. 
Indeed, any bit of information can be interpreted as the 
empty cell of a natural number, in which can be recorded either 
“0” = “consciousness” or “1” = reality. Before any recording, 
the sell is only a natural number. 
5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The main conclusion is: that reading of Husserl’s 
phenomenology is as possible as fruitful. It implies the 
interpretation of “phenomenon” in Husserl’s meaning as 
Numbers (capitalized to be emphasized their generalized, 
Pythagorean sense): 
They are what “remains” after the eidetic reduction of 
whatever, or after eidetic reduction of all eidoi (the eidos of 
eidos). Therefore, Numbers are the (transcendental) 
phenomenon of all (psychological) phenomena.  
In the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology, that reading 
postulates additionally that a universal eidos can be identified 
as the transcendental phenomenon of all phenomena. 
Furthermore, it can be substantive as Numbers.  
A basic direction of future work is the fundamentally 
philosophical (or “phenomenological”) foundation of 
arithmetic as a secondary science about the primary Numbers 
as numbers. A link and reverse reading from “Logical 
investigations” to “Philosophy of arithmetic” seems to be 
fruitful: 
One studies philosophically arithmetic as that specification 
of logic, to which distinguishability, e.g. by choice and well-
ordering, is complemented.   
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